http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Korean_Air_Lines_Flight_007_transcripts

Это то, что анализировалось ИКАО (поэтому на английском).
Теперь давай цитату, которую ты обещал.

«Мой муж не скрывал страха перед этим полетом, - говорила вдова командира Чхон И Чжи. - За два дня до рейса он стал нервничать еще больше и застраховал свою жизнь на крупную сумму в пользу семьи. «Мне очень не хочется лететь — это весьма опасно», - сказал он мне на прощание»."

Ты по сути готов что-то в статье опровергнуть или нет? Готов поставить какой-нибудь факт из неё под сомнение?

И где там про разведдеятельность? Пилот, может, в принципе бздел на Боингах летать.

адвокаты, кристально чистой веры, предоставили доказательства, спецслуббы сша я вно не бздеть корейцев нанимали.

адвокаты Мэлвин Бэлаи и Чарлз Харман, представляющие интересы семей экипажа лайнера.

1815 Titovnin: "Maistrenko Comrade Colonel, that is, Titovnin."
Col. Maistrenko (Operations Duty Officer, Combat Control Center): "Yes". Titovnin: "The commander has given orders that if the border is violated—destroy [the target]." Maistrenko: "...May [be] a passenger [aircraft]. All necessary steps must be taken to identify it." Titovnin: "Identification measures are being taken, but the pilot cannot see. It's dark. Even now it's still dark." Maistrenko: "Well, okay. The task is correct. If there are no lights—it cannot be a passenger [aircraft]."

а мне достаточно того, что самолет нарушил воздушное пространство, за что и был сбит

есть не опровергнутые признания пилотов предыдущего боинга, который принудительно посадили, есть показания вдов следующего экипажа, где они признаются, что пилоты были подкуплены американскими спецслужбами и тут же застраховались перед вылетом в этот рейс

"Появилась информация, что пилоты «Боинга» за крупную сумму наняты американскими спецслужбами. Свидетельства этого привели адвокаты Мэлвин Бэлаи и Чарлз Харман, представляющие интересы семей экипажа лайнера. По их словам, вдовы командира «Боинга» и его помощника рассказали, что их мужьям пообещали солидную сумму в долларах, если они нарушат воздушную границу СССР и пролетят над советской территорией. Между южнокорейской авиакомпанией и американской разведкой заранее достигнута на сей счет тайная договоренность. Пилотов заставили согласиться на выполнение шпионской операции.

«Мой муж не скрывал страха перед этим полетом, - говорила вдова командира Чхон И Чжи. - За два дня до рейса он стал нервничать еще больше и застраховал свою жизнь на крупную сумму в пользу семьи. «Мне очень не хочется лететь — это весьма опасно», - сказал он мне на прощание»."

--San Francisco attorney Melvin Belli says that widows of Flight 007's captain and co-pilot told him and others in a Seoul hotel early this year that their husbands were paid to fly over Soviet territory. "The two widows said (their husbands) brought the money home in cash," Belli recounted in an interview.

Attorney Charles Herrmann, who with Belli has represented 83 Koreans including relatives of the 29 KAL crew members aboard the doomed plane, also attended the meeting and said his memory of it is similar to Belli's. "But I personally do not believe that the substance of what the widows told us is the explanation for the incursion into Soviet territory." Nor, he said, does he believe that the plane was on a spying mission.

A third witness to at least some of Belli's and Herrmann's meetings, Korean legislator and human rights activist Park Han Sang, said he recalls no instances in which the crew members' families talked about deliberate flights over the Soviet Union, although he added that he was often busy during interviews and could have missed key conversations.

Extensive efforts by The Times to contact surviving family members of the KAL crew in South Korea were unsuccessful.

http://articles.latimes.com/1985-10-14/news/mn-14843_1_jumbo-jet/3

Внимание, адвокаты берут свои слова обратно!!

Ладно, держите скан отчета ИКАО

http://avia.servebeer.com/KAL007%20ICAO%20DESTRUCTION%20OF%20KOREAN%20AIR%20LINES%20BOEING%20747.pdf

как изучите, пишите

3. CONCLUSIONS
3.1 The flight crew was properly certificated and qualified for the flight.
3.2 The flight crew were physically fit but extended time zone crossings and the level of
utilization of crew flight and duty times had the potential for one or more ofthe flight crew to experience
fatigue and a reduction ofsituational awareness.
3.3 The aircraft was properly certificated and had been maintained in accordance with
approved procedures. The aircraft was serviceable when dispatched from Anchorage.
3.4 There was no indication of an in-flight failure of the navigation systems, the weather
radar, the instrumentation or other equipment ofthe aircraft.
3.5 The adjustment of the departure time for the flight was in accordance with Korean Air
Lines' standard practice.
3.6
Seoul.
The actual time of departure of KE 007 would have resulted in an on-time arrival in
3.7 KE 007 turned to a magnetic heading of about 245 0
which it reached three minutes after
lift-off and then maintained until the attack.
3.8 KE 007 passed approximately 6 NM north ofCairn Mountain NDB and 12 NM north of
Bethel VORTAC.
3.9 The maintenance of a constantmagnetic heading and the resulting track deviation was due
to the crew's failure to note that the autopilot had either been left in heading mode or had been switched
to INS when the aircraft was beyond the range (7.5 NM) for the INS to capture the desired track.
3.10 The maintenance of a constant magnetic heading was not due to any aircraft system
malfunction.
3.11 The autopilot was not controlled by an INS.
3.12 Manual control of the autopilot was not exercised by the crew by the use of heading
selection.
3.13 The flight crew's failure to detect that the navigation systems had not been selected
correctly to maintain the desired track may have been contributed to by inadequate displays of the
operative modes selected.
3.14 The flight crew did not implement the proper navigation procedures to ensure the aircraft
remained on its assigned track throughout the flight.
3.15 The failure to detect the aircraft's deviation from its assigned track for over five hours
indicated a lack ofsituational awareness and flight deck co-ordination on the part ofthe crew.3.16
3.17
procedures.
- 60-
Korean Air Lines training procedures on the use ofINS were adequate.
The flight crew had the necessary training and experience· in long-range navigation
3.18 The deviation from its assigned track resulted in KE 007 penetrating USSR sovereign
airspace over Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island and the surrounding territorial waters.
3.19 According to the representatives ofthe United States, the military radar installations in
Alaska were not aware in real time that the aircraft was proceeding west with an increasing northerly
deviation from the recognized airways system.
3.20 KE 007 proceeded westbound out ofthe AlaskanADIZ, through the Alaskan DEWIZand
the Alaskan Air Command buffer zone well north ofR20. According to the representatives ofthe United
States, no radar observations were made of a westbound aircraft north ofR20 and crossing the Alaskan
identification zones.
3.21 There were no indications that the crew of KE 007 deliberately maintained a constant
magnetic heading.
3.22 There was a normal, relaxed atmosphere on the flight deck of KE 007.
3.23 The proximity of an RC-135 (a United States intelligence aircraft) and KE 007 northeast
of Kamchatka Peninsula resulted in confusion and the assumption by the USSR air defence that the
aircraft proceeding towards the USSR was an RC-135.
3.24 USSR military aircraft attempted to intercept KE 007 over Kamchatka Peninsula.
3.25 Information was freely available to flight crews that an aircraft penetrating prohibited
areas of USSR sovereign airspace over Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island might be fired upon
without warning.
3.26 The USSRair defence command centrepersonnel on Sakhalin Island were concerned with
the position ofthe intruder aircra:ft in relation to USSR sovereign airspace as well as its identity.
3.27 The time factor became paramount in the USSR air defence command centres. as the
intruder aircraft was about to coast out from Sakhalin Island.
3.28 Exhaustive efforts to identify the intruder aircraft were not made, although apparently
some doubt remained regarding its identity.
3.29 USSR military aircraft intercepted KE 007 over Sakhalin Island.
3.30 It was not possible to assess the distance ofthe interceptor aircraft from the intruder nor
their relative positions when the interceptor's lights were flashed and the cannon fired.- 61 -
3.31 The USSR military aircraft did not comply with the leAO standards and recommended
practices for interception of civil aircraft before attacking KE 007.
3.32 The USSR air defence command assumed that KE 007 was a United States RC-135
reconnaissance aircraft before they ordered its destruction.
3.33 The military radar installations of the Japanese Defence Agency were aware that an
aircraft was tracking into USSR airspace over Sakhalin Island. According to the representatives ofJapan,
they were not aware that it was a civil aircraft off its intended track.
3.34 According to the representatives ofJapan KE 007 was squawking SSR code 1300 when
observed by the Japanese military radar installations.
3.35 It was common practice among flight crews to squawk a non-discrete SSR code ending
with zero zero before selecting code 2000 for entry into Tokyo radar controlled airspace in the vicinity
of NOHO.
3.36 The flight crew ofKE 007 was not aware of the presence of the USSR interceptor aircraft before or at the time of the attack.
3.37 KE 007 was hit by at least one of two air-to-air missiles fired from a USSR SU-15
interceptor aircraft.
3.38 As a result of the attack there was substantial damage to KE 007 which affected the
controllability of the aircraft and caused a loss of cabin pressure. The flight crew of KE 007 retained
limited control ofthe aircraft and responded correctly to the loss of cabin pressure.
3.39 It was not possible to determine the position of KE 007 at the time of the missile attack
in relation to USSR sovereign airspace.
3.40
impact.
The flight recorderssiInultaneously ceased operation 1 minute 44 seconds after themissile
3.41 The aircraft descended in a spiral and radar contact was lost at 5 000 metres at
18:35 hours. It could not be established whether the crew was able to maintain limited control.
3.42 The aircraft was destroyed on impact with the sea. The impact was not survivable.
3.43 During the interception USSR rescue services were alerted and following the destruction
of KE 007 they were directed to the area.
3.44 The Tokyo ACe and RCC took the appropriate steps to alert the emergency services
when the aircraft became overdue.

сделали падающих обезьянок - дальше то че эт все мусолить?

Спасибо.

а вот законодательство стран, на территорию которых он вторгается, позволяет сбивать его

то ответь всё ж.

Статья 36. Применение оружия и боевой техники при охране государственной границы СССР

Пограничные войска и Войска противовоздушной обороны, осуществляя охрану государственной границы СССР, для отражения вооруженного нападения и вторжения на территорию СССР, пресечения вооруженных провокаций на государственной границе СССР, предотвращения угона советских воздушных судов без пассажиров на борту, а также против нарушителей государственной границы СССР на суше, воде и в воздухе в ответ на применение ими силы или в случаях, когда прекращение нарушения или задержание нарушителей не может быть осуществлено другими средствами, применяют оружие и боевую технику.

Понятно. Не хочешь отвечать, тогда я отвечу:

жидовские адвокаты начали показания менять

Точка.

альтруист толерантный за обезьян тут очко тренируешь - тьфу на тебя

Пропаганда навела сперва тень на плетень, а потом порядочным адвокатам пришлось защищать свои добрые имена.